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Racism and the Parties

144 posts in this topic

If the stimulus spending hasn't significantly happened yet, remaining even now more than a full order of magnitude less that the Fed's injection, then how is it reasonable to attribute improvements to that initiative?

By the same token, how is it reasonable for the right wing to conclude that the stimulus package is a failure? Ben Bernanke, whose loose monetary policies are implicitly praised by MM, is a big fan of the stim package. I'll take his word for it.

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By the same token, how is it reasonable for the right wing to conclude that the stimulus package is a failure? Ben Bernanke, whose loose monetary policies are implicitly praised by MM, is a big fan of the stim package. I'll take his word for it.
I agree that it can't be considered a failure. And I think that there will be some level of stimulus as a result of it. But I think that will have to be balanced against the future cost of higher taxes to pay for it. And it should be remembered that some of it will go forward as new entitlements. And it's effect has to be assessed in the context of the enormously larger injection of dough into the economy that was engineered by the Fed. On balance, I think we would have been better off to have had an immediate moratorium on payroll taxes to reduce the cost of employees so that unemployment wouldn't climb so high, and we should have at least considered subsidies for home purchases for anyone willing to buy, not just first timers, as a way to stabilize the real estate market which was still in free fall at the time. That dough could all have gone out the door immediately instead of being spread over several years. What's the point of spending 80% of the stimulus dough AFTER the economy is in strong recovery (which it is forecast to be in the last quarter of this year)? By that point, shouldn't we have turned our attention to controlling deficit spending? Edited by Michael Major

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Yeah, I understand the argument. That's why I keep harping on the fact that the Fed's injection of dough was 20X the injection of the stimulus package. I mean, how much bigger a 2X4 than Obama's does the Feds have to be to get Democrat mules attention?

If you understand that Posner's argument was deeply flawed, if not deliberately misleading, why was it posted to bolster your case?

I am also not convinced that money spent propping up AIG, J.P. Morgan, etc., were responsible for the improvement we saw last quarter, although it did, in my view, save the system from a complete meltdown (knock wood).

But hey, at least we agree that big government spending did the trick, so I won't quibble over details.

:)

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I agree that it can't be considered a failure. And I think that there will be some level of stimulus as a result of it. But I think that will have to be balanced against the future cost of higher taxes to pay for it. And it should be remembered that some of it will go forward as new entitlements. And it's effect has to be assessed in the context of the enormously larger injection of dough into the economy that was engineered by the Fed. On balance, I think we would have been better off to have had an immediate moratorium on payroll taxes to reduce the cost of employees so that unemployment wouldn't climb so high, and we should have at least considered subsidies for home purchases for anyone willing to buy, not just first timers, as a way to stabilize the real estate market which was still in free fall at the time. That dough could all have gone out the door immediately instead of being spread over several years. What's the point of spending 80% of the stimulus dough AFTER the economy is in strong recovery (which it is forecast to be in the last quarter of this year)? By that point, shouldn't we have turned our attention to controlling deficit spending?
If you understand that Posner's argument was deeply flawed, if not deliberately misleading, why was it posted to bolster your case?

I am also not convinced that money spent propping up AIG, J.P. Morgan, etc., were responsible for the improvement we saw last quarter, although it did, in my view, save the system from a complete meltdown (knock wood).

But hey, at least we agree that big government spending did the trick, so I won't quibble over details.

:)

Hey, fellow Keynesians. We're all socialists now, too!

BTW, it won't surprise me...in fact, I'll be shocked if Obama doesn't become something of a deficit hawk as his first term winds down. With the economy moving forward again, it'll be good policy and good politics.

Also, count on this: The GOP will fight him every step of the way.

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Steve Kornachi in Salon on 2/3/11. http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_roo...egy/index.html:

<h1 class="headline">The "Southern Strategy," fulfilled</h1> <h2 class="deck">When Ronald Reagan's invoked "states' rights" in 1980, it helped seal a massive political realignment </h2>

Democrats thought they had solved their Southern problem in 1976, when a peanut farmer-turned-Georgia governor named Jimmy Carter swept through the old Confederacy, winning every state except Virginia en route to a narrow electoral college victory over President Gerald Ford. For the first time in 12 years, the Democrats had won a national election -- and Dixie was the reason why.

This resurgence, though, was little more than a mirage -- a brief interruption in the South's steady march away from the Democratic Party, which in many ways culminated in Carter's defeat four years later at the hands of Ronald Reagan.

The story of why Reagan was in position to run against Carter in 1980 -- and how he managed to turn Carter's prideful home region against its native son -- really begins in 1964, when regional tensions within the Democratic Party finally reached a breaking point. Since Reconstruction, when white Southerners developed a bitter hostility to Reconstruction and its northern Republican liberal architects, Dixie had been the most staunchly Democratic region in the country -- so loyal that FDR actually won over 95 percent of the vote in several Southern states. For decades, the South elected Democrats at every level of the ballot; practically speaking, there was no two-party system in the region.

But as blacks migrated away from Jim Crow and into northern cities, Democratic leaders outside of the South came to see the enactment of civil rights laws as a political imperative. The Republican Party, then the default home of anti-segregation northern liberals, was well-positioned to win the loyalty of the blacks who moved North (where they were suddenly eligible to vote). Thus, the alliance between Northern machine Democrats and Southern conservatives frayed -- until finally Lyndon Johnson put his pen to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The reaction from Southern Democrats was uniformly hostile. '64 was an election year, but Richard Russell, Herman Talmadge, Russell Long, among more than a dozen other Southern senators and governors, boycotted the party's national convention in Atlantic City. And many of the Southerners who did show up came looking for trouble. 43 of the 53 members of the Alabama delegation, for instance, refused to pledge their support for the national ticket of Johnson and Hubert Humphrey and were denied seating. And most of the all-white Mississippi delegation walked out when convention organizers demanded that a rival delegation -- the Mississippi Freedom Democrats, a group of civil rights activists who argued that the state's official delegation failed to reflect the diversity of the party -- be seated with them as "honored guests," and that two of the Freedom Democrats serve as at-large delegates. Infuriated by this "humiliation" and "embarrassment," an up-and-coming Mississippi Democrat named Charles Pickering -- who decades later would become the center of a national controversy because of his racial history -- left the party on the spot, joined the GOP and became one of the godfathers of modern Mississippi Republican politics.

None of this caused Johnson too much worry in '64. The nation had rallied around him after John F. Kennedy's assassination the year before and, anyway, civil rights was a popular cause outside the South. That his Republican opponent, Arizona Sen. Barry Goldwater, had actually joined Southern Democrats in their futile filibuster of the Civil Rights Act only made Johnson that much more of a shoo-in. He was elected in a thunderous landslide, racking up more than 60 percent of the popular vote. But the landslide wasn't universal: In the South, Goldwater broke through and won five states -- the best showing in the region for a GOP candidate since Reconstruction. In Mississippi -- where FDR had won nearly 100 percent of the vote just 28 years earlier -- Goldwater claimed a staggering 87 percent. Civil rights had finally come to a head in 1964, and the two parties had made their choice.

The highlight of Goldwater's campaign, to the extent there was one, probably came at the end of October, when the candidate's biggest celebrity supporter -- an actor and one-time Democrat named Ronald Reagan --

on his behalf. As well-received as it was, the speech did little to help the doomed Goldwater. But the conservative true believers who had had embraced Goldwater and helped him topple the GOP's liberal Rockefeller establishment took note: Reagan was just as conservative as Goldwater, but far more marketable. The television age was dawning, and he was tailor-made for it.

Two years later, amidst a voter backlash against Johnson and his Great Society, Reagan handily defeated Pat Brown to become California's governor. With the 1968 Republican nomination wide open, he was immediately touted as a contender, with Goldwater conservatives begging with him to run. Well into '68, though, Reagan remained ambivalent, a posture that ended up costing him. By the time he threw his hat into the ring, Richard Nixon had already made serious inroads with the Goldwater crowd -- particularly in the South, where Senator Strom Thurmond, one of the first segregationist Democrats to flip to the GOP, served as his chief supporter. Reagan made a play, but Nixon held him off, then went on to defeat Hubert Humphrey in the fall.

It was under Nixon that the "Southern Strategy" was born. The idea was simple: Millions of white Southern voters who had been raised to vote straight Democratic tickets were feeling more and more alienated from the national Democratic Party. They were up for grabs -- Goldwater had proven it. But Goldwater had also gone too far: His explicit rejection of the Civil Rights Act played well in Dixie, but made him a monster to the rest of the country. The trick, then, was to wink and nod at white Southerners with signals that were simultaneously nebulous and unmistakable. Instead of arguing against civil rights, Nixon talked about "law and order" and, later, busing. In the fall of '68 his task was complicated by the presence of Wallace, who ran a baldly racist third party campaign and won five Southern states. But Nixon managed to peel off Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and South Carolina. He ended up with 301 electoral votes, but without those 43 from the South, he would have fallen short of the magic 270 mark.

As president, Nixon continued to court Southerners aggressively. Slowly, Republican candidates began winning races for the U.S. House and Senate in Southern states. Nixon swept the region in his 1972 reelection campaign -- although he swept the rest of the country too, winning 49 states over George McGovern. It was against this backdrop that Democrats were so elated by Carter's victory in 1976. Given the chance to vote for one of its own, the South had returned to the Democratic fold. Maybe Dixie could be saved after all.

But the Republican Carter had beaten, Gerald Ford, in many ways represented the Republican Party Southerners had rejected before Goldwater came along. A moderate Michigan congressman who was appointed vice president by Nixon in 1973, Ford had little natural kinship with Dixie, and he lacked Nixon's cunning in exploiting the region's racial sensitivities. In the '76 GOP primaries, Ford was challenged by Reagan. In the early-going, with most of the primary and caucus action in the North, Ford ran up six straight victories over Reagan. With his campaign on the ropes, Reagan then prevailed in North Carolina -- thanks to a huge assist from Jesse Helms, another former segregationist Democrat-turned-Republican. Reagan was a far better fit for Dixie than Ford, and his Carolina triumph set off a wave of late primary wins. The delegate race was virtually tied by the convention, though Reagan ended up falling just short.

As soon as Ford lost to Carter, Reagan became the overwhelming favorite for the 1980 GOP nomination. The man Goldwater conservatives had first sized up as presidential timber 16 years before was finally in position to lead the party. After an early hiccup in Iowa, Reagan crushed his main primary competitor, George H.W. Bush and sealed the nomination. Unemployment, inflation and interest rates were all high, and American confidence was sagging, thanks mainly to the economy, but also the the protracted hostage crisis in Iran. After accepting the GOP nomination in mid-July in Detroit, Reagan found himself running more than 20 points ahead of Carter (who had still not officially fended off Ted Kennedy's intraparty challenge). It was at that point that Reagan, his voice hoarse from an infection, took a few weeks off for a working vacation.

At the end of July, Reagan's campaign announced that he would resume campaigning on August 3. The first event on his calendar seemed innocuous enough: a county fair in rural south-central Mississippi. But the Neshoba County and its annual fair enjoyed a racially fraught history. 16 years earlier, at the height of "Freedom Summer," three civil rights workers from the North -- Andrew Goodman, James Chaney, and Michael Schwerner -- had been abducted and murdered by the Klan in Philadelphia, Miss., Neshoba's county seat. Local and state politicians, like many local residents, had reacted by playing dumb "Maybe they went to Cuba," Mississippi's governor, Paul Johnson, said when news first broke that the trio had gone missing. The Neshoba fair had been around since the late 19th Century, and it had become a popular campaign stop for segregationist candidates in Mississippi -- the notorious Ross Barnett was a regular. But no presidential candidate had ever before showed up. Until Ronald Reagan.

Reagan and his campaign sensed political opportunity, both in Mississippi and across the South. The state had voted for Carter in '76, but only by two points. Reagan's Mississippi state chairman, a young congressman named Trent Lott, was adamant that it could be flipped. So it was that a cheery Reagan took the stage that August afternoon and issued one of the most thinly veiled appeals to racial resentment in modern American politics. ""I believe in states' rights," he told the uniformly white crowd of 30,000 Mississippians, "and I believe in people doing as much as they can for themselves at the community level and at the private level." Technically, he was talking about welfare policy, his aim in using the term "states' rights" -- the rallying cry for every politician who'd fought civil rights legislation in the 1950s and 1960s -- was unmistakable. The crowd responded with delirious cheers.

That fall, Reagan carried Mississippi -- and every other state in the South, except Carter's native Georgia. The Neshoba moment did not, by itself, bring this outcome about (although his margins in Mississippi and other southern states were exceedingly narrow). Nor did the South, by itself, account for Reagan's victory over Carter. (It was, after all, a 44-state landslide.) But the 1980 election established that the South's break with the Democratic Party wouldn't be a short-term phenomenon. And if there's one moment that captured the spirit that animated this realignment, it was Reagan's proud invocation of "states' rights" -- and his audience's gleeful response. It was the fulfillment of the Southern Strategy.

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Steve Kornachi in Salon on 2/3/11. http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_roo...egy/index.html:

<h1 class="headline">The "Southern Strategy," fulfilled</h1> <h2 class="deck">When Ronald Reagan's invoked "states' rights" in 1980, it helped seal a massive political realignment </h2>

Democrats thought they had solved their Southern problem in 1976, when a peanut farmer-turned-Georgia governor named Jimmy Carter swept through the old Confederacy, winning every state except Virginia en route to a narrow electoral college victory over President Gerald Ford. For the first time in 12 years, the Democrats had won a national election -- and Dixie was the reason why.

This resurgence, though, was little more than a mirage -- a brief interruption in the South's steady march away from the Democratic Party, which in many ways culminated in Carter's defeat four years later at the hands of Ronald Reagan.

The story of why Reagan was in position to run against Carter in 1980 -- and how he managed to turn Carter's prideful home region against its native son -- really begins in 1964, when regional tensions within the Democratic Party finally reached a breaking point. Since Reconstruction, when white Southerners developed a bitter hostility to Reconstruction and its northern Republican liberal architects, Dixie had been the most staunchly Democratic region in the country -- so loyal that FDR actually won over 95 percent of the vote in several Southern states. For decades, the South elected Democrats at every level of the ballot; practically speaking, there was no two-party system in the region.

But as blacks migrated away from Jim Crow and into northern cities, Democratic leaders outside of the South came to see the enactment of civil rights laws as a political imperative. The Republican Party, then the default home of anti-segregation northern liberals, was well-positioned to win the loyalty of the blacks who moved North (where they were suddenly eligible to vote). Thus, the alliance between Northern machine Democrats and Southern conservatives frayed -- until finally Lyndon Johnson put his pen to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The reaction from Southern Democrats was uniformly hostile. '64 was an election year, but Richard Russell, Herman Talmadge, Russell Long, among more than a dozen other Southern senators and governors, boycotted the party's national convention in Atlantic City. And many of the Southerners who did show up came looking for trouble. 43 of the 53 members of the Alabama delegation, for instance, refused to pledge their support for the national ticket of Johnson and Hubert Humphrey and were denied seating. And most of the all-white Mississippi delegation walked out when convention organizers demanded that a rival delegation -- the Mississippi Freedom Democrats, a group of civil rights activists who argued that the state's official delegation failed to reflect the diversity of the party -- be seated with them as "honored guests," and that two of the Freedom Democrats serve as at-large delegates. Infuriated by this "humiliation" and "embarrassment," an up-and-coming Mississippi Democrat named Charles Pickering -- who decades later would become the center of a national controversy because of his racial history -- left the party on the spot, joined the GOP and became one of the godfathers of modern Mississippi Republican politics.

None of this caused Johnson too much worry in '64. The nation had rallied around him after John F. Kennedy's assassination the year before and, anyway, civil rights was a popular cause outside the South. That his Republican opponent, Arizona Sen. Barry Goldwater, had actually joined Southern Democrats in their futile filibuster of the Civil Rights Act only made Johnson that much more of a shoo-in. He was elected in a thunderous landslide, racking up more than 60 percent of the popular vote. But the landslide wasn't universal: In the South, Goldwater broke through and won five states -- the best showing in the region for a GOP candidate since Reconstruction. In Mississippi -- where FDR had won nearly 100 percent of the vote just 28 years earlier -- Goldwater claimed a staggering 87 percent. Civil rights had finally come to a head in 1964, and the two parties had made their choice.

The highlight of Goldwater's campaign, to the extent there was one, probably came at the end of October, when the candidate's biggest celebrity supporter -- an actor and one-time Democrat named Ronald Reagan --

on his behalf. As well-received as it was, the speech did little to help the doomed Goldwater. But the conservative true believers who had had embraced Goldwater and helped him topple the GOP's liberal Rockefeller establishment took note: Reagan was just as conservative as Goldwater, but far more marketable. The television age was dawning, and he was tailor-made for it.

Two years later, amidst a voter backlash against Johnson and his Great Society, Reagan handily defeated Pat Brown to become California's governor. With the 1968 Republican nomination wide open, he was immediately touted as a contender, with Goldwater conservatives begging with him to run. Well into '68, though, Reagan remained ambivalent, a posture that ended up costing him. By the time he threw his hat into the ring, Richard Nixon had already made serious inroads with the Goldwater crowd -- particularly in the South, where Senator Strom Thurmond, one of the first segregationist Democrats to flip to the GOP, served as his chief supporter. Reagan made a play, but Nixon held him off, then went on to defeat Hubert Humphrey in the fall.

It was under Nixon that the "Southern Strategy" was born. The idea was simple: Millions of white Southern voters who had been raised to vote straight Democratic tickets were feeling more and more alienated from the national Democratic Party. They were up for grabs -- Goldwater had proven it. But Goldwater had also gone too far: His explicit rejection of the Civil Rights Act played well in Dixie, but made him a monster to the rest of the country. The trick, then, was to wink and nod at white Southerners with signals that were simultaneously nebulous and unmistakable. Instead of arguing against civil rights, Nixon talked about "law and order" and, later, busing. In the fall of '68 his task was complicated by the presence of Wallace, who ran a baldly racist third party campaign and won five Southern states. But Nixon managed to peel off Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and South Carolina. He ended up with 301 electoral votes, but without those 43 from the South, he would have fallen short of the magic 270 mark.

As president, Nixon continued to court Southerners aggressively. Slowly, Republican candidates began winning races for the U.S. House and Senate in Southern states. Nixon swept the region in his 1972 reelection campaign -- although he swept the rest of the country too, winning 49 states over George McGovern. It was against this backdrop that Democrats were so elated by Carter's victory in 1976. Given the chance to vote for one of its own, the South had returned to the Democratic fold. Maybe Dixie could be saved after all.

But the Republican Carter had beaten, Gerald Ford, in many ways represented the Republican Party Southerners had rejected before Goldwater came along. A moderate Michigan congressman who was appointed vice president by Nixon in 1973, Ford had little natural kinship with Dixie, and he lacked Nixon's cunning in exploiting the region's racial sensitivities. In the '76 GOP primaries, Ford was challenged by Reagan. In the early-going, with most of the primary and caucus action in the North, Ford ran up six straight victories over Reagan. With his campaign on the ropes, Reagan then prevailed in North Carolina -- thanks to a huge assist from Jesse Helms, another former segregationist Democrat-turned-Republican. Reagan was a far better fit for Dixie than Ford, and his Carolina triumph set off a wave of late primary wins. The delegate race was virtually tied by the convention, though Reagan ended up falling just short.

As soon as Ford lost to Carter, Reagan became the overwhelming favorite for the 1980 GOP nomination. The man Goldwater conservatives had first sized up as presidential timber 16 years before was finally in position to lead the party. After an early hiccup in Iowa, Reagan crushed his main primary competitor, George H.W. Bush and sealed the nomination. Unemployment, inflation and interest rates were all high, and American confidence was sagging, thanks mainly to the economy, but also the the protracted hostage crisis in Iran. After accepting the GOP nomination in mid-July in Detroit, Reagan found himself running more than 20 points ahead of Carter (who had still not officially fended off Ted Kennedy's intraparty challenge). It was at that point that Reagan, his voice hoarse from an infection, took a few weeks off for a working vacation.

At the end of July, Reagan's campaign announced that he would resume campaigning on August 3. The first event on his calendar seemed innocuous enough: a county fair in rural south-central Mississippi. But the Neshoba County and its annual fair enjoyed a racially fraught history. 16 years earlier, at the height of "Freedom Summer," three civil rights workers from the North -- Andrew Goodman, James Chaney, and Michael Schwerner -- had been abducted and murdered by the Klan in Philadelphia, Miss., Neshoba's county seat. Local and state politicians, like many local residents, had reacted by playing dumb "Maybe they went to Cuba," Mississippi's governor, Paul Johnson, said when news first broke that the trio had gone missing. The Neshoba fair had been around since the late 19th Century, and it had become a popular campaign stop for segregationist candidates in Mississippi -- the notorious Ross Barnett was a regular. But no presidential candidate had ever before showed up. Until Ronald Reagan.

Reagan and his campaign sensed political opportunity, both in Mississippi and across the South. The state had voted for Carter in '76, but only by two points. Reagan's Mississippi state chairman, a young congressman named Trent Lott, was adamant that it could be flipped. So it was that a cheery Reagan took the stage that August afternoon and issued one of the most thinly veiled appeals to racial resentment in modern American politics. ""I believe in states' rights," he told the uniformly white crowd of 30,000 Mississippians, "and I believe in people doing as much as they can for themselves at the community level and at the private level." Technically, he was talking about welfare policy, his aim in using the term "states' rights" -- the rallying cry for every politician who'd fought civil rights legislation in the 1950s and 1960s -- was unmistakable. The crowd responded with delirious cheers.

That fall, Reagan carried Mississippi -- and every other state in the South, except Carter's native Georgia. The Neshoba moment did not, by itself, bring this outcome about (although his margins in Mississippi and other southern states were exceedingly narrow). Nor did the South, by itself, account for Reagan's victory over Carter. (It was, after all, a 44-state landslide.) But the 1980 election established that the South's break with the Democratic Party wouldn't be a short-term phenomenon. And if there's one moment that captured the spirit that animated this realignment, it was Reagan's proud invocation of "states' rights" -- and his audience's gleeful response. It was the fulfillment of the Southern Strategy.

The BIG problem with this post is that it is so blatantly partisan in its nature. What is true about it is that racists found in the states rights movement a halltree where they could hang their hats. What's false about it is that it uses that as an attempt to delegitimize the entire states rights argument, an argument that becomes more and more relevant with each passing day. The analog from the right would be to make that argument that socialists found a home in the democratic party and that therefore the democratic party itself represents socialism. As a matter of fact, given today's attempts by the democratic party to engineer a government takeover of the healthcare sector of our economy, that analogous argument holds a LOT more water.

Edited by Michael Major

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I am so tired of the huge lie that the "Affordable Health Care" act is a government take over of health care. All it does is force a patient's bill of rights onto the existing health care providers. Unfortunately, there was no single payer or government option -- that would have saved even more time and money. In fact, Medicare for all would have been great with it's 2% overhead, no recissions and no millionaire CEOs to pay.

With your logic, that would mean that having "Air Traffic Controllers" is a government take over of the airline industry.

Give me a break.

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I am so tired of the huge lie that the "Affordable Health Care" act is a government take over of health care. All it does is force a patient's bill of rights onto the existing health care providers. Unfortunately, there was no single payer or government option -- that would have saved even more time and money. In fact, Medicare for all would have been great with it's 2% overhead, no recissions and no millionaire CEOs to pay.

With your logic, that would mean that having "Air Traffic Controllers" is a government take over of the airline industry.

Give me a break.

Actually, what it does is impose new costs on insurance companies by requiring certain new protocols and then it restrains the raising of premiums to cover those costs. Do you believe that when a company has increasing costs and steady or diminished income, it can continue to exist? Of course not, it will go under, just like GM. And the end result will be the same, an eventual government takeover. Except that with health care, there won't be a divestiture by the central government, rather a consolidation throughout the health care sector of our economy.

Incidentally, that "bill of rights" is taking away my health care arrangements - removing my right to make my own health care decisions. It makes it impossible for high deductible insurance policies and HSAs to continue. It accomplishes that by requiring insurance companies to offer only policies that cover even the most routine and 100% expected sorts of health care consumption rather than actual INSURANCE to cover the unexpected and high cost events that we all are used to indemnifying ourselves against with collision insurance on our automobiles and fire and casualty insurance on our homes. And it doing that, it contributes to higher health care cost inflation, inflation which can only be controlled through rationing.

BTW, ATC is no more a takeover of the airline industry than traffic laws constitute a takeover of the automobile industry. In the health care sector of our economy, the analog would be the FDA and the state licensing boards for health care providers.

The plan that Zarras lays out goes a long way toward addressing the problems that Americans have with our current arrangements and it controls costs at the same time. "Remember, our current system of indirect payments for medical care came about as a result of World War II wage controls, under which employers realized they could raise an employee’s “compensation” by paying for their medical insurance. Since then, endless additions of regulations and stipulations on what must be covered, and how insurance can be sold, have straitjacketed the free market’s ability to work its wonders in the health care sector of our economy. Nowadays, the often “gold-plated” medical benefits given to some unions in lieu of higher wages are killing state budgets. ObamaCare, at its core, just enlarges the very system we already have, the system that is both fundamentally broken and bankrupting us. It can not work.

By contrast, in places where HSA’s are being offered, people are voluntarily flocking to them. For example, in the state of Indiana, 70% of state employees have switched into HSA’s. The state is projected to save over $20 million in 2010 because of this, and the employees have accumulated over $30 million in their HSA’s since the plan’s inception. Ironically, using HSA’s can achieve what was originally intended after the WW II wage controls: they can increase an employee’s total compensation, but in an actuarially sound way."

Edited by Michael Major

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Nice to hear from you again, Carol. And thanks again, Michael.

Perhaps it is something of an overreach to state that the so-called ACA is a "government takeover" of health care, but not much of one. Any program which requires me to purchase a product or service I may not want or be able to afford, which product or service may have features I neither want, need or can afford, and which tells the provider of the product or service what must be included in every item, who must be given the product or service, how much must be charged for the product or service, and how the proceeds of that product or service may be spent comes pretty close to a government takeover, at least of the health insurance industry.

THAT is what I disapprove of. This foray into quasi-socialized medicine, like Medicare, medicaid, and S-CHIP before it, is unwarranted, unnecessary, and unconstitutional on any level and under any rationale used to justify it.

It should not have been proposed, let alone enacted, without a formal, solemn debate on the nature of the powers and duties of a government of limited and delegated powers. I, for one, am not seeking a return to the Articles of Confederation. I asm seeking, however, that the general government respect its limitations, and not try to be the problem solver-in-chief for every socioeconomic and political ill in our society. I cannot understand how or why it is the general government's duty or responsibility (let alone right) to try to manage the economy, rebuild infrastructure, educate anyone, rebuild the cities, or prop up or bail out failing or mismanaged businesses. I do not understand how or why we should want, expect, or look to the general government to "create jobs," when government jobs are either at best drains on the economy or temporary in nature. Nobody, from the president on down, has explained any of this to my satisfaction, and I don't think the advocates care to even try.

It irks, pains and galls me that the very same people who castigated Bush for stretching and violating the Constitution in the name of national security are so blithely and blindly willing to shred the same Constitution in the name of "helping people" or "saving the economy." Why people cannot understand that ANY Constitutional violation or overextension is equally damaging to the fabric of society, regardless of reason or who advocates the violation/overextension.

Lest I be accused of not providing an alternative to the so-called ACA, I offer this solution: LET THE STATES USE THEIR SOVEREIGN POWER TO DEAL WITH THIS IF THEIR CITIZENS DESIRE IT. The States have the power. There is noting in the ACA which the States cannot do, if they have the desire and will (absent some provision of their Constitutions which prevent their acting).

I'm sorry I drifted off topic here, but the thread took this twist.

Let the bricks fly.

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Nice to hear from you again, Carol. And thanks again, Michael.

Perhaps it is something of an overreach to state that the so-called ACA is a "government takeover" of health care, but not much of one. Any program which requires me to purchase a product or service I may not want or be able to afford, which product or service may have features I neither want, need or can afford, and which tells the provider of the product or service what must be included in every item, who must be given the product or service, how much must be charged for the product or service, and how the proceeds of that product or service may be spent comes pretty close to a government takeover, at least of the health insurance industry.

THAT is what I disapprove of. This foray into quasi-socialized medicine, like Medicare, medicaid, and S-CHIP before it, is unwarranted, unnecessary, and unconstitutional on any level and under any rationale used to justify it.

It should not have been proposed, let alone enacted, without a formal, solemn debate on the nature of the powers and duties of a government of limited and delegated powers. I, for one, am not seeking a return to the Articles of Confederation. I asm seeking, however, that the general government respect its limitations, and not try to be the problem solver-in-chief for every socioeconomic and political ill in our society. I cannot understand how or why it is the general government's duty or responsibility (let alone right) to try to manage the economy, rebuild infrastructure, educate anyone, rebuild the cities, or prop up or bail out failing or mismanaged businesses. I do not understand how or why we should want, expect, or look to the general government to "create jobs," when government jobs are either at best drains on the economy or temporary in nature. Nobody, from the president on down, has explained any of this to my satisfaction, and I don't think the advocates care to even try.

It irks, pains and galls me that the very same people who castigated Bush for stretching and violating the Constitution in the name of national security are so blithely and blindly willing to shred the same Constitution in the name of "helping people" or "saving the economy." Why people cannot understand that ANY Constitutional violation or overextension is equally damaging to the fabric of society, regardless of reason or who advocates the violation/overextension.

Lest I be accused of not providing an alternative to the so-called ACA, I offer this solution: LET THE STATES USE THEIR SOVEREIGN POWER TO DEAL WITH THIS IF THEIR CITIZENS DESIRE IT. The States have the power. There is noting in the ACA which the States cannot do, if they have the desire and will (absent some provision of their Constitutions which prevent their acting).

I'm sorry I drifted off topic here, but the thread took this twist.

Let the bricks fly.

Good to see you here Richard. Your postings are always thoughtful and incisive. When last we discussed this topic in the dedicated thread, I was taking the position that the nationalization of health care should be fought on the grounds that it's misguided policy and hang the issue of its constitutionality. You continued to focus on the constitutionality aspect, and I have to say, I've been surprised and heartened that there arose such a public conversation about that very thing. I agreed with you then and I agree with you now on that question, but I am uncertain about prospects for defeating it at the USSC. However, I want to endorse fully your suggestion that it's at the state level that the problem should be addressed. In addition to your reasoning for that, there's also the advantage that a variety of solutions can be tried out, giving us more of a research laboratory, experimental sort of approach to the search for a fiscally sound solution to the problem.

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Returning to the subject of this thread...

DITTOHEADS, RACE AND DENIAL.

From Salon, 11/17/10:

http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_roo...ium%29_7_30_110

By Steve Kornacki

On Tuesday, I learned that there is a circumstance under which right-wingers are happy to align themselves with RINOs: in hindsight over the issue of civil rights.

I discovered this almost by accident, after including in a post about Rush Limbaugh's confused racial paranoia -- he can't seem to decide whether powerful white Democrats are conspiring to stifle the ambitions of their black counterparts or if they've been intimidated by political correctness into excessive deference -- a line in which I characterized the Republican Party as "an overwhelmingly white party that owes its strength to decades of growth in the South, a result of its 1964 decision to reject the Civil Rights Act."

It's not exactly a revolutionary claim, given the crucial role the South has played in the rise of modern conservatism and the degree to which the region has been remade as a Republican bastion -- a reality driven home by this month's midterms, which left the GOP, as the New York Times put it, "at a stronger position in the South than at any time since Reconstruction." The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not the only reason for the GOP's evolving dominance in the South (nor is race in general), but it does mark a pivotal turning point in the relationship between the region and both political parties.

But, at least to judge from the e-mail I received on Tuesday, many conservatives aren't comfortable acknowledging this. By Tuesday afternoon, my in box was flooded with irate responses, virtually all of them making the exact same point: A greater percentage of Republicans than Democrats voted for the Civil Rights Act in Congress in 1964. Many of the e-mails included the exact partisan vote breakdown in both chambers. "Care to redo that rejection of the Civil Rights Act you discuss in the article?" one correspondent asked.

Through a quick Google search, I discovered that my piece had been linked at Lucianne.com, the right-wing news forum created a decade ago by Lucianne Goldberg (the same woman who infamously prodded Linda Tripp to rat out Monica Lewinsky to Kenneth Starr). The comments, just like the e-mails I was receiving, were filled with reminders of the partisan breakdown of the '64 vote. Who was this guy Kornacki claiming that the modern Republican Party had capitalized on the South's resistance to civil rights? "[T]the Democrats actually filibustered against the law," one typical comment read. "Simple fact is that the Republicans passed the Civil Rights Act. Only left wing biased historians keep lying about the facts."

A little more searching revealed that Limbaugh himself has been sounding the same theme. "All these were Democrats in the civil rights days that opposed civil rights," he said in a broadcast this past August. "They were Democrats. Bull Connor, Democrat. Lester Maddox, Democrat. George Wallace, Democrat. J. William Fulbright, Democrat." So have other prominent voices on the right. "As with the 1957 and 1960 civil rights acts, it was Republicans who passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act by huge majorities," Ann Coulter wrote back in May. "A distinctly smaller majority of Democrats voted for it."

What Rush and Ann (and the folks who e-mailed me and filled up the comments section at Lucianne.com) don't mention, of course, is that all of the Democrats who voted against civil rights back in the '60s were conservative white Southerners, while most of the Republicans who voted for civil rights were moderate-to-liberal Northerners -- and that in the years following the '64 vote, each of these groups migrated to the other party.

I've written about this history before, but it's worth going over once more. During the "radical Reconstruction" that followed the Civil War, liberal national Republicans installed liberal GOP governments throughout the South, stirring intense feelings of resentment, humiliation and resistance among most Southern whites. When Rutherford B. Hayes, convinced that these whites would be more cooperative if they were left to control their own affairs, ended Reconstruction in 1877, one Republican state government after another fell. Virtually every Southern white voter lined up with the Democratic Party, simply because the GOP had been the party of Reconstruction. Jim Crow laws were quickly enacted, and decades of segregation ensued.

In all this time, Northern Democrats were mostly content to look the other way, seeing the South as a crucial source of electoral support within Congress and in presidential elections. The overwhelming margins that Democratic White House candidates routinely ran up in the region can't be emphasized enough. In 1916, for instance, Woodrow Wilson won 85 percent of the vote in Louisiana, 92 percent in Mississippi and 96 percent in South Carolina; nationally, his share was 49 percent. In 1936, FDR took 98.5 percent in South Carolina and 97 percent in Mississippi. Even Adlai Stevenson, while getting crushed nationally by Dwight Eisenhower, took 70 percent in Georgia in 1952. For all intents and purposes, the Republican Party didn't exist in the South.

Civil rights changed this. The impetus was the Great Migration, the movement of millions of African-Americans away from the South and to the urban centers of the North and West Coast -- places where there were no Jim Crow laws to keep them from voting. Suddenly, civil rights became a priority for the Democratic Party's urban bosses; if they didn't go to bat for these new voters, they'd risk losing their grip on power -- especially with the rival Republican Party, then filled with educated liberal Northerners, compiling a much better record on the issue. (It was Republican Theodore Roosevelt, remember, who invited Booker T. Washington to dinner at the White House in 1901.) No longer could Northern Democrats ignore and abide Jim Crow.

In 1948, Democrats, urged on by an ambitious Minneapolis mayor named Hubert Humphrey, adopted a civil rights plank at their convention. Southern delegates promptly walked out and rallied around South Carolina's Democratic governor, Strom Thurmond, who won four Southern states (and 2.4 percent of the national popular vote) running as a "Dixiecrat" in November. Democrats managed to tamp down the South's anger for the next decade or so, but by '64 the issue could wait no longer. The party's officeholders and voters outside the South uniformly supported the sweeping civil rights bill working its way through Congress. President Lyndon Johnson, who had pushed through a watered-down civil rights bill as the Senate's majority leader back in 1957, did too. When he put his signature on the new law, LBJ supposedly noted that he'd just signed away the South for a generation.

At the same time, the Republican Party, which had racked up a largely admirable record on civil rights, took a sharp turn to the right, nominating for president Barry Goldwater, an Arizona senator who had supported Southern Democrats in their effort to filibuster the civil rights bill. The new law, Goldwater argued, would create a "police state" and foster an "informer" mentality among citizens. By all measures, Goldwater was no racist when it came to his personal views, but in 1964 he made common cause with every white Southerner who wanted to deny African-Americans federally guaranteed equality. These white Southerners, as noted above, had voted Democratic for their whole lives. But in the fall of '64, they rejected LBJ and embraced Goldwater in stunning numbers. In Mississippi, Goldwater claimed 87 percent of the vote. In Alabama, nearly 70 percent. In South Carolina, nearly 60 percent. Mind you, Goldwater only received 38 percent nationally -- one of the worst-ever showings for a major party candidate. He was roundly rejected in every corner of the country. The only voters who liked him? White Southern "Democrats."

Just consider Time magazine's state-by-state handicapping of the race a few weeks before Election Day '64. Mississippi? "Barry's anti-civil rights vote makes him an all but certain winner," the magazine (correctly) predicted. Louisiana? "Barry has been slipping, but the big segregationist vote north of New Orleans should put him over." (It did.) Here's how Time analyzed the politics of the "Democratic" South in the wake of the Civil Rights vote:

[Goldwater is] abloom in the South. Florida's Democratic candidate for Governor, Haydon Burns, said last week that he would not campaign for his party's national ticket, and added: "I expect the Republican candidate will have strong support in Florida." Louisiana's Democratic Governor John McKeithan admits that he may well decide to back Barry. The recent Mississippi Democratic convention was filled with pro-Goldwater sentiment. Georgia's Democratic Senators Richard Russell and Herman Talmadge both predict privately that today Barry could carry their state. Pollster Sam Lubell discovered last week that Goldwater is, as of now, running ahead of Johnson in Florida, Virginia, South Carolina and North Carolina. In Texas, Lubell found Lyndon holding an uneasy lead that could quickly vanish under the pressure of civil rights troubles.

Goldwater ended up carrying five Southern states in '64. The election marked the beginning of the region's steady, decades-long shift to the Republican Party. Think of Richard Nixon's "Southern strategy" (which a future Republican national chairman would apologize for) and Ronald Reagan's decision to tout "states' rights" as he launched his 1980 general election campaign in Philadelphia, Miss. (where three civil rights workers had been murdered just 16 years earlier). It didn't happen overnight, but Southern states began routinely voting for GOP candidates for president (with blips in 1976 and 1992, when the Democrats nominated Southerners), and Democratic officeholders began defecting to the Republican Party (although plenty of entrenched conservative Democratic officials finished out their careers with the party).

As the New York Times noted after this month's midterms, just about the only Democrats left in Congress from the old Confederacy represent majority black districts that were created by the Voting Rights Act after the 1990 census. Otherwise, as the paper put it, "Southern white Democrats in Congress have become as rare as a Dixie blizzard." In effect, the region's white voters have gone from uniformly Democratic to uniformly Republican. And it's obvious when and why the transformation really took hold.

So, yes, Rush, it's true: Plenty of Republicans did support civil rights back in 1964. They were moderates and liberals with names like Margaret Chase Smith, George Aiken, Clifford Case and Jacob Javits -- and as the GOP became an ideologically right-wing, Southern-dominated party they were, in many cases, driven out for being RINOs (Case and Javits both saw their careers end in Republican primaries, as the "New Right" targeted them in its purge campaign of the late '70s). The voters who'd elected them began to favor Democrats more regularly, a response to the GOP's embrace of Southern-style conservatism.

And, yes, Rush, it's also true that plenty of Democrats did oppose the Civil Rights Act in '64. It's just that they became Republicans (or started voting like Republicans) as soon as it became law.

For what it's worth, I responded to one of my email interlocutors on Tuesday with a (very truncated) version of this history. A few hours later, I received this response:

Was Martin Luther King one of those Southern Republicans? Tell me just what the Liberal Democrats have done for African Americans other than keeping them on the Plantation for voting purposes?

  • Steve Kornacki is Salon's news editor. Reach him by email at SKornacki@salon.com and follow him on Twitter @SteveKornacki More: Steve Kornacki

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Interesting considering that Mitt Romney, a Mormon, just selected Paul Ryan who somehow rationalizes Ayn Rand with Roman Catholocism, and plans to end medicare and cut medicaid to cut the top income tax rate by 10%. Civil Rights didn't really aline the South with racist policies, but it fits in with the notion of "the federal govt and godless liberals forcing us to ....." and "obama doesn't really look like us." There's still a sense of victimhood down here, with both black and white to be sure. But on the white side there's resentment that whites are not actually a minority in the US, and "we need to return to the America of yesterday."

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Interesting considering that Mitt Romney, a Mormon, just selected Paul Ryan who somehow rationalizes Ayn Rand with Roman Catholocism, and plans to end medicare and cut medicaid to cut the top income tax rate by 10%. Civil Rights didn't really aline the South with racist policies, but it fits in with the notion of "the federal govt and godless liberals forcing us to ....." and "obama doesn't really look like us." There's still a sense of victimhood down here, with both black and white to be sure. But on the white side there's resentment that whites are not actually a minority in the US, and "we need to return to the America of yesterday."

May I suggest you start researching facts instead of the Democrat playbook of shadow tricks and half truths.

plans to end medicare and cut medicaid to cut the top income tax rate by 10%
Watch this and see if you can see another view.

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May I suggest you start researching facts instead of the Democrat playbook of shadow tricks and half truths.

Watch this and see if you can see another view.

May I suggest you read my post noting racism plays in both parties here in the south. and do not have a nice day. No flaming on the site

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From Salon:

The New face of “Democrats are the Real Racists!”

The National Review's lame attempt at revisionist political history

BY ALEX PAREENE

Apparently it is a great big lie — an “utter fabrication with malice and forethought” — to say that the Democrats lost their longtime hold over the old Confederacy because their support for civil rights legislation drove white Southerners away. That’s according to the National Review’s Kevin Williamson, who wrote a big National Review piece about how mad this lie makes him, when the secret truth is that Republicans have always been, and will always be, the single most pro-civil rights party ever.

The piece is largely an attempt to add a patina of respectability to the ancient, brainless comment thread talking point about how Robert Byrd was in the Klan, but lots of Republicans voted for the Civil Rights Act, so therefore Democrats are the real racists. (In this respect, the piece is an homage to Jonah Goldberg’s “Liberal Fascism,” which attempted to expand “Nazi stands for National Socialist” to book length, without pictures.) The only problem is that the “lie” he’s arguing against is 100 percent true, except when he states it in such a way that it no longer resembles what anyone has ever actually claimed.

So: It’s true, and no one denies this, that Republicans used to be very good on civil rights and Democrats used to be super racist. It’s true that Woodrow Wilson was a bigot and (Northern, liberal) Republican senators were better than (Southern, conservative) Democratic senators on civil rights in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. Williamson’s argument seems to be that Republicans couldn’t have taken advantage of a Democratic split over civil rights by appealing to racist white Southern voters because Republicans were too uniformly pro-civil rights, themselves. (This great big lie he’s debunking is one that Nixon and Lee Atwater and Ronald Reagan happily signed on to — they were thrilled when the Democrats fractured the New Deal coalition by eventually embracing civil rights!)

Williamson would, I guess, call it revisionist history, but he has revised all of the history out of it.

Even if the Republicans’ rise in the South had happened suddenly in the 1960s (it didn’t) and even if there were no competing explanation (there is), racism — or, more precisely, white southern resentment over the political successes of the civil-rights movement — would be an implausible explanation for the dissolution of the Democratic bloc in the old Confederacy and the emergence of a Republican stronghold there. That is because those southerners who defected from the Democratic Party in the 1960s and thereafter did so to join a Republican party that was far more enlightened on racial issues than were the Democrats of the era, and had been for a century.

Oh, did they? It’s dubious to argue that the party that nominated Barry Goldwater for president was “far more enlightened” than the one that nominated Kennedy, but Johnson was a big ol’ Texas racist, so sure, fine, pretend Nelson Rockefeller cancels out Barry. But the segregationists didn’t all wake up and decide to vote for Republicans starting in 1965 — they revolted. George Wallace started a third party. They continued fighting for racism within the party, and they eventually lost. But it wasn’t until the conservative movement had finished fully taking over the Republican Party that the great shift finished.

After devoting a lot of words to LBJ’s very real history of being a loud-mouthed racist, Williamson explains that Johnson’s dumb, loud-mouthed racism was just a reflection of the whole of Democratic Party philosophy and belief since time immemorial.

Johnson did not spring up from the Democratic soil ex nihilo. Not one Democrat in Congress voted for the Fourteenth Amendment. Not one Democrat in Congress voted for the Fifteenth Amendment. Not one voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Eisenhower, as a general, began the process of desegregating the military, and Truman, as president, formalized it, but the main reason either had to act was that President Wilson, the personification of Democratic progressivism, had re-segregated previously integrated federal facilities. (“If the colored people made a mistake in voting for me, they ought to correct it,” he declared.) Klansmen from Senator Robert Byrd to Justice Hugo Black held prominent positions in the Democratic Party — and President Wilson chose the Klan epic Birth of a Nation to be the first film ever shown at the White House.

Johnson himself denounced an earlier attempt at civil-rights reform as the “nigger bill.” So what happened in 1964 to change Democrats’ minds? In fact, nothing.

What is the funniest part of this: How it basically makes one brief stop in between 1875 and the mid-20th century in its exhaustive history of Democratic racism? Or how Williamson is clearly annoyed at having to even slightly, obliquely credit Harry Truman (Democrat!) for desegregating the armed forces, a thing (Democrat) Harry Truman did? Like, maybe what happened in 1964 was the eventual result of an intraparty battle that was happening in 1948 when Democrat Harry Truman desegregated the armed forces (and Strom Thurmond, future Republican, threw a big fit about it)?

The 1964 Civil Rights Act, and Lyndon Johnson’s role in ensuring its passage, was one major victory in a years-long effort by the party’s liberals to make the Democratic Party the civil rights party, and it worked so well that the racists were effectively no longer welcome. They responded by changing their positions or changing sides. It wasn’t an overnight change, because politics is slow, but it happened: Robert Byrd and even George Wallace changed their positions on black civil rights and apologized. Those who couldn’t adapt, or those for whom bigotry was more genuine belief than political opportunism, left the party. Strom Thurmond became a Republican. Lester Maddox launched a third-party presidential bid against Jimmy Carter and eventually endorsed Republican Pat Buchanan in1992. Maddox was also a charter member of the Council of Conservative Citizens, the white supremacist paleoconservative group that once counted Trent Lott, Thurmond and Jesse Helms as members. These guys are the heirs to the conservative white Southern Democrat tradition. I’m not really sure they themselves would consider it a pernicious lie to say as much.

What would have been much, much more entertaining would have been if, instead of writing this piece about “Democrats” and “Republicans,” Williamson had written it about liberals and conservatives. Barry Goldwater and George Wallace both used conservative rhetoric to justify their segregationist beliefs — and so did William F. Buckley. Both parties at the time had liberal and conservative wings, and in each of those parties it was the liberal wing that was right on civil rights.

There was really only one American political party with a solid record on civil rights in the first half of the 20th century, and it was the American Communist Party. But “in praise of the liberal Northeastern Republicans who stood with the communists on civil rights and who were eventually driven from the party by conservatives like the ones who founded this magazine” would not go over well in the National Review, I imagine.

Williamson goes on to argue that the white South didn’t go Republican because of civil rights, it went Republican because of … the New Deal. So while the change happened too slowly and gradually to be ascribed to racism, it can happily be pinned on a series of popular economic programs that had been enacted 30 years prior to 1964. (Programs so popular that Southern racists and blacks joined together in a political coalition that lasted until liberals began … winning civil rights victories.)

But let’s not also forget to blame hippies and welfare:

The Republican ascendancy in Dixie is associated with the rise of the southern middle class, the increasingly trenchant conservative critique of Communism and the welfare state, the Vietnam controversy and the rise of the counterculture, law-and-order concerns rooted in the urban chaos that ran rampant from the late 1960s to the late 1980s, and the incorporation of the radical Left into the Democratic Party. Individual events, especially the freak show that was the 1968 Democratic convention, helped solidify conservatives’ affiliation with the Republican Party.

In other words, it was literally everything that was going on in the 1960s besides civil rights issues that made white Southerners eventually fully embrace the Republican Party. (And blacks continue to support the Democrats because Democrats lied about what happened in the 1960s and because Johnson promised them free government money forever, apparently.)

I mean it’s obviously true that the shift didn’t happen purely because of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but it’s just as obviously true that it’s a hilarious and deeply stupid misreading of history to pretend that the Republican Party has always and will always be the champion of civil rights.

[Thanks to, and please also read: Adam Serwer, Jonathan Chait, Mark Schmitt, Clay Risen, and Jonathan Bernstein.]

Alex Pareene writes about politics for Salon and is the author of "The Rude Guide to Mitt." Email him at apareene@salon.com and follow him on Twitter @pareene

MONDAY, MAY 28, 2012

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Imo, it's a bit more complex. And, I believe people change. LBJ, for example, wasn't purely about power. I also don't think Goldwater was a racist, and think it's clear that he just didn't believe the fed govt had any power to tell an individual whom to hire or whom to serve in a private biz. I worked for a man who was the same age as Bushthefirst, and was born in Petal, Miss. His views no doubt changed.

Here are two links to blogs describing the emergence of the gop in Miss, one form each political view. The substance of which is from the dem (cottonmouth) side,

" Rubel Phillips quote from his first run for governor in 1963:

"I was born a segregationist, I am for segregation now, and I will be for segregation when I die."

His campaign song that year had the following lyrics:

"Rubel, Rubel, We're all rebels, Fighting for our native land, Against the Kennedy carpetbaggers, Bobby, Jack, and all the clan."

He also backed Gov. Ross Barnett in 1962 when Barnett attempted to block James Meredith's admission to Ole Miss, said claims that he was a closet integrationist were the farthest thing from the truth, and used as his slogan "K.O. the Kennedys". Not exactly a racial moderate in 1963.

Phillips changed his tune in 1967, however, and ran as a racial moderate. He even gained the support of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party that year. Good on him for that.

Now let's look at something Ambassador Palmer said in praise of Phillips for the 1967 campaign:

I remember seeing him on television saying that ‘Congressman Williams is telling you we’re never going to integrate schools. I’m not going to tell you that, because we ARE going to integrate schools.’ Rubel said, and I’m paraphrasing this, that, ‘You know, when you reach down and help someone – you help the poor and underprivileged– when you do that, you help yourself. And that is what we must do to give a fair and equal education, to create an equal opportunity to work and make a living, to ensure justice and respect in the courts of law. That helps everyone, but it starts with those of us who can lend a hand to help out those who need a hand.'

A Republican running for statewide office today who kicked off his or her campaign with a quote like

I only moved here in the 80s, and have no idea what the gop stood for prior to civil rights. It appears to have been simply non-existent. But, I just don't see racism in the Miss Gop. Haley Barbour engineered Reagan's Neshoba County Fair states rights speech, but as governor he was just about jobs. States' rights isn't necessarily about racism as much as it is about federalism.

But sure, in the 60s the Southern Dems were told to leave the party or embrace desegragation and voters rights. However, those people are dead. Today, if you suggest political redistricting be done in the South merely to advantage or disadvantage a political party, it's as if you're suggesting racism, yet outside the south that is exactly what is done. Redistricting under voters rights means the controlling party must first preserve the "african american districts" mandated in the current DOJ approved zoning. Regardless of motivation, the effect is divisive.

In Nov, Romeny will get 65% of the Miss vote. Some of those people would never vote for an african american, but they wouldn't vote for a white guy who passed the stimulus bill and ACA either. Not to say both are totally without some logical basis or that we're talking one world socialist govt. LOL

sorry about the links. I'll work on that.

Edited by bendog

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I think Bill Maher aptly sums up the current situation: Being a Republican today doesn't mean you're a racist. But if you're a racist, you're almost certainly a Republican.

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I think Bill Maher aptly sums up the current situation: Being a Republican today doesn't mean you're a racist. But if you're a racist, you're almost certainly a Republican.

Several years ago, I went to my local democrat county meeting for volunteers for a governor race. Aside from a guy from the national party, I was the only White. The rest of the folks made it very clear I need not have applied to volunteer. I realize my city has not had a Maynard Jackson type who actually believed the only color that matters is green from guys bringing jobs.

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From www.thedemocraticstrategist.org. (4/23/13)

The Media Coverage of Ron Paul’s “The GOP Was Always for Civil Rights” Revisionist History Failed to Clearly Report the Central Reality, That the Exploitation of White Racial Resentment Was For Decades the GOP’s Fundamental Political Strategy Regarding African-Americans.

By Ed Kilgore, James Vega and J.P. Green

Ron Paul’s recent appearances on largely African-American college campuses to promote

the notion that the GOP was always a firm supporter of civil rights and the true friend of

African-Americans was met with widespread and well-deserved ridicule. But the commentary

on his revisionist history lessons failed to confront a key fact: this claim is not only utterly

and completely false, but is most emphatically not just an idiosyncratic notion of Paul’s. It is

an integral part of a larger attempt by conservatives to whitewash the GOP’s shameful past

on racial issues, an attempt that extends from Glenn Beck, the Tea Party and other right-wing

commentators on the one hand, to the pages of the National Review on the other.

As Ed Kilgore noted in a recent commentary at the Washington Monthly’s Political Animal blog:

Paul seems to be peddling the highly revisionist take on civil rights history laid out last

year in National Review by Kevin Williamson, which holds that Republicans always

were and always will be the party of civil rights while Democrats have consciously

switched their white supremacist tactics from Jim Crow to “plantation” socialism. It’s a

hallucinatory approach to developments too recent and too well known to fool

people about, and for that reason, it’s a line of argument that tends to offend people,

particularly those being told they are fools for voting Democratic.

The evidence that refutes this attempt to rewrite history is simply incontrovertible. Just by

themselves, widely-known public statements by the major architects of the GOP’s “Southern

Strategy” clearly demonstrate three things:

• That the GOP’s “Southern Strategy” was an approach consciously designed to exploit

white racial resentment of African-Americans in order to benefit the GOP.

• That it was designed and executed by the most important political strategists of

the Republican Party – the men who were top political advisors to Richard Nixon,

Ronald Reagan and George Herbert Walker Bush.

• That it was so deeply offensive to all African-Americans that the head of the Republican

National Committee felt obligated to formally apologize for it in the mid - 2000s.

It is outrageous that these three facts did not appear in every single one of the mainstream

commentaries on Rand Paul’s Soviet-style rewriting of history. After all, it was not as if the

facts were at all difficult to find. All the mainstream commentators had to do to find the

precise, fully documented quotes that they needed was to open up a source as simple as

Wikipedia and type in the words “Southern Strategy.” Had they bothered to look, here’s

what they would have found:

As with most Wikipedia entries, the entry on the “Southern Strategy” starts with a quick

summary:

Though the “Solid South” had been a longtime Democratic Party stronghold due

to the Democratic Party’s defense of slavery before the American Civil War and

segregation for a century thereafter, many white Southern Democrats stopped

supporting the party following the civil rights plank of the Democratic campaign in

1948 (triggering the Dixiecrats), the African-American Civil Rights Movement,

the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965,

and desegregation.

The strategy was first adopted under future Republican President Richard Nixon

and Republican Senator Barry Goldwater in the late 1960s. The strategy was

successful in many regards. It contributed to the electoral realignment of Southern

states to the Republican Party, but at the expense of losing more than 90 percent

of black voters to the Democratic Party.

The extensive and fully footnoted body of the Wikipedia entry identifies the origin of the

southern strategy in the exodus of white southerners from the Democrats in 1964 as a

reaction to the 1963 civil rights act:

1964 Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater won his home state of Arizona and

five states in the Deep South. The Southern states, traditionally Democratic up to that

time, voted Republican primarily as a statement of opposition to the Civil Rights Act,

which had been passed by Johnson and the Democrats in Congress earlier that year...

The Wikipedia entry then proceeds to focus in on Richard Nixon’s political strategist Kevin

Phillips and his 1970 book, The Emerging Republican Majority, which became the major

strategic blueprint behind the Nixon and Agnew political playbook. As it says:

...Although the phrase “Southern strategy” is often attributed to Nixon’s political

strategist Kevin Phillips, he did not originate it, but merely popularized it. In an

interview included in a 1970 New York Times article, he touched on its essence:

From now on, the Republicans are never going to get more than 10 to 20

percent of the Negro vote and they don’t need any more than that...but

Republicans would be shortsighted if they weakened enforcement of the

Voting Rights Act. The more Negroes who register as Democrats in the

South, the sooner the Negrophobe whites will quit the Democrats and become

Republicans. That’s where the votes are. Without that prodding from the

blacks, the whites will backslide into their old comfortable arrangement with

the local Democrats.

Even four decades later, the cynicism of this strategy remains stunning and Phillips himself

later forcefully repudiated and apologized for his earlier views. But the strategy was key to

the gradual political realignment across the South that began in the 1970s, a realignment in

which African-Americans dramatically increased their role in the Southern Democratic

Party and in campaigns as Democratic candidates while in response Southern white voters

increasingly shifted their support to the GOP.

The Southern Strategy was equally central to the approach of the Republican Party’s next

major political strategist – Lee Atwater. After the 1980 election Atwater became an aide in

the Ronald Reagan administration, working under political director Ed Rollins. In 1984,

Rollins managed Reagan’s re-election campaign, and Atwater became the campaign’s

deputy director and political director. In 1988 Atwater was the campaign manager for

George Herbert Walker Bush’s successful 1988 presidential campaign and after the

election became chairman of the Republican National Committee. In short, Atwater was

by far the most important and influential GOP political strategist of the 1980s.

The Wikipedia entry provides the following, deeply revealing story:

Bob Herbert, a New York Times columnist, reported a 1981 interview with Lee Atwater,

published in Southern Politics in the 1990s by Alexander P. Lamis, in which Lee Atwater

discussed politics in the South:

:

Questioner: But the fact is, isn’t it, that Reagan does get to the Wallace voter

and to the racist side of the Wallace voter by doing away with legal services,

by cutting down on food stamps.

Atwater: You start out in 1954 by saying, “N***r, n****r, n****r.” By 1968

you can’t say “n****r” — that hurts you. Backfires. So you say stuff like

forced busing, states’ rights and all that stuff. You’re getting so abstract

now [that] you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re

talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is [that]

blacks get hurt worse than whites....obviously sitting around saying, “We

want to cut this,” is much more abstract than even the busing thing, and

a hell of a lot more abstract than “N****r, n****r.”

Herbert wrote in the same column, “The truth is that there was very little that was

subconscious about the G.O.P.’s relentless appeal to racist whites. Tired of losing

elections, it saw an opportunity to renew itself by opening its arms wide to white

voters who could never forgive the Democratic Party for its support of civil rights and

voting rights for blacks.”

Seen with this background, Rand Paul’s attempt to tell African-American college students

that the GOP always supported civil rights and was the real friend of black folk while the

Democrats were their real enemies can only be described as utterly dishonest, and in its

aggressiveness, actively offensive. The truth about the GOP’s cynical exploitation of white

racial resentment has always been so brutally clear to every African-American that in the

mid-2000s the head of the Republican National Committee actually decided to explicitly

apologize, a fact that can also be found in the same Wikipedia entry. As it notes:

Ken Mehlman, Bush’s campaign manager and Chairman of the RNC, held several

large meetings with African-American business, community, and religious leaders. In

his speeches, he apologized for his party’s use of the Southern Strategy in the past.

In 2005, When asked about the strategy of using race as an issue to build GOP

dominance in the once-Democratic South, Mehlman replied,

“Republican candidates often have prospered by ignoring black voters and

even by exploiting racial tensions,” and, “by the ‘70s and into the ‘80s and ‘90s,

the Democratic Party solidified its gains in the African-American community,

and we Republicans did not effectively reach out. Some Republicans gave up

on winning the African-American vote, looking the other way or trying to benefit

politically from racial polarization. I am here today as the Republican chairman

to tell you we were wrong.”

It was very safe and easy for mainstream commentators to criticize Rand Paul. But the

real scandal was their utter and complete failure to powerfully and categorically refute

Paul’s profoundly dishonest rewriting of history with the raw quotes and facts that were

available to them literally at their fingertips.

And there is one other critical fact that needs to be underlined as well. Rand Paul is

emphatically not alone in this cynical attempt at an inversion of political history. Glenn Beck,

spokesmen for the Tea Party and other conservative talk radio hosts now widely circulate the lie that Martin Luther King was a Republican (when in fact he publicly called on African-Americans to vote against Barry Goldwater in 19641 and successfully negotiated the

pivotal Civil Rights Act with Democratic president John Kennedy and the Voting Rights Act

with Lyndon Johnson). The National Review, once viewed as representing intellectually

honest conservatism, now shamelessly promulgates a more verbose but equally dishonest

version of the “The GOP was always African-Americans’ real friend” myth and the Republican

National Committee now effectively disavows the apology of its former chairman.

It is rarely appropriate to use the term “The Big Lie Technique” in modern political discourse

because of its close association with totalitarianism. But in this particular case there is

simply no other phrase available in the English language that can adequately express

the cynical essence of the GOP’s current attempt to rewrite the history of its decades-long

exploitation of white racial resentment. If Republicans want to perform “outreach” to

African-American voters, and that would be an excellent development for both political

and moral reasons, they should begin with a thoroughgoing disavowal, not denial, of their

past strategies and tactics.

http://www.thedemocr...reclaim_mar.php

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